Joined Aug 2010
6,752 Posts | 17+
The Far East
there were not actually any panthers at prokhorovka. the 200 panthers were with the Grossdeutschland division which was with army group Kemp. as for tigers the LSSAH had 4 operational tigers on the 12th, Totenkopf 10 and Das Reich 1. the rest being mk IIIs, mkIVs and the StuG's and other SPG'sThe numbers for Prokhorovka of Frieser & Glantz are fundamentally incompatible; IMHO those of Col Glantz are more coherent; anyhow, the issue is again not that relevant, as the gloal figures for Kursk are not affected.
The Panthers were minority at Prokhorovka, most of the tanks of the II & III SS Panzer Corps were Mark IV, with some Tigers; the Soviet 1st Tank Army & 5th Guards Tank Corps have mostly T-34 & T70 (2:1 respectively) interestingly with some 35 British vehicles (Churchill III).
so far as i know i think that number of the destroyed tanks at the battle were latter recovered and repaired by the soviets. the germans all through the offensive were recovering there own broken down tanks and had a highly effective recover team. its worth pointing out that it was with the following soviet counter offensive of operation Kutuzov and Rumyantsev that the germans lost much more tanks then during the offensive phase as they were unable to recover them.A critical factor mostly ignored here was the intensive recycling and cannibalization of the destroyed vehicles from both sides; e.g. the Germans had returned over 600 damaged tanks back into the fight over the period of July 5 to 18, while many of the Soviet tanks were rebuilt up to four times to keep them in the fight; ergo, the possession of the battlefield (highly contested but eventually retained by the Soviets) where so many damaged vehicles were abandoned, was decisive for this battle; just from this advantage the Soviets were able to double their available tank strength at the end of this battle.
i have no doubt about it that even if the germans did succeed the results would not have been much. this is shown perfectly when in a conversation hitler had with his generals prior to the offensive Guderian had asked why we were even attacking at all at kursk. someone replied that we had to attack for political reasons. that was the whole under pinning of the operation. it was not a military solution to a military problem but a military solution to a political problem. a german victory here would restore the prestige of the ostheer and reaffirm the axis countries of final german victory as many were now looking to make terms. what was supposed to at first just be a quick offensive launched as soon as possible to effect the soviets offensive capabilities soon grew to include large amounts of scarse military resources against a goal that would not have effected the military solution much. what they were really looking for with the offensive was breathing space, time so that they could divert forces to meet the expected allied invasion and then turn back to russia.In hindisght, the presumption of the "lost" or "almost" victory should IMHO be considered mostly German opportunistic revisionism, because the general trend of the war couldn't have been any more eloquent; from Kursk onwards, never again did the Wehrmacht recover the initiative in any other campaign.