Best Infantry of World War I

Boy Blue said:

How can anyone say the Germans were the best.

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Look at the miles of territory gained in the Spring Offensive 1918. The Germans gained more ground in a shorter amount of time then the Allies had gained in various battles lasting months at at time. In places they gained about 35 miles of territory.

Compare that with the various miles gained in Allied assaults, there was a great difference. Prior to the 100 Days Offensive, no Allied attack gained anywhere near that ammount of territory...

And this was done with the Germans beginning to approach the limits of their endurance.

Total German Casualties in the Spring Offensive: just under 700,000
Total Allied Casualties in the Spring Offensive: over 800,000

The attack was carried with the last of Germany's strength in the hopes of ending the war before too many American units could enter. And tactically it was a German success, but Foch managed to strategically outthink Ludendorf, and as a result, the offensive accomplished little in the way of real success for the Germans. And after it, German exhaustion finally caught up with them, allowing for the rapid Allied advances of the 100 Days Offensive...

I mean, it's fairly easy to defeat a foe who's national economy is dead, his people are losing confidence in the government, and he's running out of men to even man the line...

Sam-Nary said:

Look at the miles of territory gained in the Spring Offensive 1918. The Germans gained more ground in a shorter amount of time then the Allies had gained in various battles lasting months at at time. In places they gained about 35 miles of territory.

Compare that with the various miles gained in Allied assaults, there was a great difference. Prior to the 100 Days Offensive, no Allied attack gained anywhere near that ammount of territory...

And this was done with the Germans beginning to approach the limits of their endurance.

Total German Casualties in the Spring Offensive: just under 700,000
Total Allied Casualties in the Spring Offensive: over 800,000

The attack was carried with the last of Germany's strength in the hopes of ending the war before too many American units could enter. And tactically it was a German success, but Foch managed to strategically outthink Ludendorf, and as a result, the offensive accomplished little in the way of real success for the Germans. And after it, German exhaustion finally caught up with them, allowing for the rapid Allied advances of the 100 Days Offensive...

I mean, it's fairly easy to defeat a foe who's national economy is dead, his people are losing confidence in the government, and he's running out of men to even man the line...

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Some twisted logic here. You don't win wars by attacks that uses up all your strengths and achieves nothing.

The German Spring Offensive was against a weakened British 5th Army, weakened because LLoyd George denied them the vital manpower required for the new uncompleted defenses which the 5th Army had just taken over from the French. The defenses were not the usual trenches but wire with block houses defending each strip. The Germans broke through these lines yes, the 5th Army was in disarry, but the Germans just exhausted themselves and each of their five attacks all came to nothing and they were not good enough to prevent Allied counter offensive from beating them.


　
As one German Colonel expressed it ; "We collapsed in August, 1918, and on the battlefield, not in consequence of the revolution in the homeland which followed the collapse. We were beaten for purely military reasons, it was not the homeland but the fighting forces of our opponents which brought our Armies to ruin." The German defeat in 1918, How Ludendorff Tried to Exonerate the Army 1940.

The Secretary-of-State, Erzberger, pleaded for an immediate suspension of Allied military operations because "nothing but the cessation of Allied attacks would make it possible to re-establish discipline in the German Army…" Major-General von Winterfeldt and Minister-Plenipotentiary Count Oberndorff emphasised the inability of the German Army to undertake any further orderly withdrawal or resume fighting, stressing that "the Germany Army was beset by unimaginable difficulties: exhaustion among the troops who have been fighting without pause for four months; the consequent relaxation of discipline; the blocking of roads and railways, which paralyzed all movement…" Foch Memories.


Despite the set-backs and frustrations of four years of war, the poor staff work of 1915, the appalling tragedy of 1 July 1916, the dramatic reversal of fortune at Cambrai, the fate of 5th Army in its under-manned and ill-prepared defences on March 21, 1918, it was Haig's BEF that ultimately bore the brunt of the fighting in the campaign that ended in Allied victory. This fact is most clearly illustrated in the number of German prisoners taken, and German artillery pieces captured, during the final '100 Days' campaign, 18 July to 11 November 1918.

Army
Prisoners Captured
Guns Captured
British Expeditionary Force
188, 700
2840
French
139,000
1880
American
43,200
1421
Belgian
14,500
474


Edmonds, Short history of World War One

bartieboy said:

I know they did, and they did a fantastic job but it is clear to me that you have a big bias towards Canadian troops so I wonder if it is worth the effort to even discuss this subject with you.

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I wouldn't say that I'm biased, if you ask any Canadian history buff (such as me) who had the best infantry in WW1 you'd get the same answer. Heck, they even teach these facts in Canadian schools.

[SIZE=-1]Iwould say it was a toss up between the Canadians and Australians, with the Canadians winning by a whisker.[/SIZE]

I agree.

Dragon said:

I wouldn't say that I'm biased, if you ask any Canadian history buff (such as me) who had the best infantry in WW1 you'd get the same answer. Heck, they even teach these facts in Canadian schools.

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They probably don't teach you any French, Italian, Serb, Belgian and Russian ''facts'' do they?

Boy Blue said:

Some twisted logic here. You don't win wars by attacks that uses up all your strengths and achieves nothing.

The German Spring Offensive was against a weakened British 5th Army, weakened because LLoyd George denied them the vital manpower required for the new uncompleted defenses which the 5th Army had just taken over from the French. The defenses were not the usual trenches but wire with block houses defending each strip. The Germans broke through these lines yes, the 5th Army was in disarry, but the Germans just exhausted themselves and each of their five attacks all came to nothing and they were not good enough to prevent Allied counter offensive from beating them.
　
As one German Colonel expressed it ; "We collapsed in August, 1918, and on the battlefield, not in consequence of the revolution in the homeland which followed the collapse. We were beaten for purely military reasons, it was not the homeland but the fighting forces of our opponents which brought our Armies to ruin." The German defeat in 1918, How Ludendorff Tried to Exonerate the Army 1940.

The Secretary-of-State, Erzberger, pleaded for an immediate suspension of Allied military operations because "nothing but the cessation of Allied attacks would make it possible to re-establish discipline in the German Army…" Major-General von Winterfeldt and Minister-Plenipotentiary Count Oberndorff emphasised the inability of the German Army to undertake any further orderly withdrawal or resume fighting, stressing that "the Germany Army was beset by unimaginable difficulties: exhaustion among the troops who have been fighting without pause for four months; the consequent relaxation of discipline; the blocking of roads and railways, which paralyzed all movement…" Foch Memories.

Despite the set-backs and frustrations of four years of war, the poor staff work of 1915, the appalling tragedy of 1 July 1916, the dramatic reversal of fortune at Cambrai, the fate of 5th Army in its under-manned and ill-prepared defences on March 21, 1918, it was Haig's BEF that ultimately bore the brunt of the fighting in the campaign that ended in Allied victory. This fact is most clearly illustrated in the number of German prisoners taken, and German artillery pieces captured, during the final '100 Days' campaign, 18 July to 11 November 1918.

Army
Prisoners Captured
Guns Captured
British Expeditionary Force
188, 700
2840
French
139,000
1880
American
43,200
1421
Belgian
14,500
474

Edmonds, Short history of World War One

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One doesn't necessarily need the best in order to win wars. From what I've read on a basic tactical level, the Germans were better then any of their compititors. Their problem is that they simoultaneously proved to be poor strategists, which resulted in the average German soldier facing a much tougher job then was required of his opponents.

I would agree that Germany lost on the field of battle, but that defeat was brought from poor strategic thinking, which has little to do with the tactical capabilities of the army in question.

Sam-Nary said:

One doesn't necessarily need the best in order to win wars. From what I've read on a basic tactical level, the Germans were better then any of their compititors. Their problem is that they simoultaneously proved to be poor strategists, which resulted in the average German soldier facing a much tougher job then was required of his opponents.

I would agree that Germany lost on the field of battle, but that defeat was brought from poor strategic thinking, which has little to do with the tactical capabilities of the army in question.

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They were tactically completely overmatched in the areas that really mattered late in the war: Heavy artillery and tanks. They achieved quality by building elite formations through stripping the not-so-elite, and then they used up this quality and a large chunk of their remaining manpower in the 1918 Michael offensive. In so doing they temporarily took back pretty much what they had already willingly given up in "Alberich" in 1917, i.e. the orderly strategic retreat to the "Hindenburg Line".

Temujin said:

What sort of quality was the Austro-Hungarian infantry? Was there any big differences between the Austrian and Hungarian armies they fielded? I assume their infantry was worse than that of the Western Europeans due to their poor performance in the war. I guess the worst infantry was probably Russian.
I really don't know much about the Ottoman infantry.

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I would say that overall Austro-Hungarian army wasnt really bad. However in those armies were people of many nationalities and most of them simply lacked motivation. They didnt know what they fight for and most of them wasnt really ready to die for their Emperor. Officer class was good and professional but common soldiers didnt really care for this war. Until today the AH army is matter of movies, comedies which show how the soldiers were doing everything to not fight.

For example, on this clip the soldiers got the lesson of patriotism:

[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=90uzKrmPfK4&NR=1&feature=endscreen"]C.K. Dezerterzy - lekcja patriotyzmu - YouTube[/ame]

At the beginning of WWI, Austro-Hungarian army inflicted several defeat to numerically stronger Russian Army. One of these defeats was Battle of Limanova which was in effect, the reverse of Battle of Marne. Russian were stopped cold.






“On the eastern front the march-up of the Austro-Hungarian troops suffered a delay of several days because of the surprise declaration of war by Russia. The troops took up their positions, not on the Russian frontiers as was originally planned, but further west, behind the fortified line along the Dniester and San Rivers.
The Austro-Hungarians were clearly outnumbered by the Russians: Austria-Hungary: 770 infantry battalions, 356 cava1ry companies, 2,098 artillery pieces. Russia: 824 infantry battalions, 694 cavalry companies, 2888 artillery pieces. The German Army, was also inferior to the Russians.
The original strategic plan called for an attack of the Austro-Hungarian armies between the Bug and Vistula Rivers in order to prevent the bulk of the Russians from attacking East Prussia. Although the joint forces were weaker than the original plan called for, Conrad von Hotzendorf did not change the original plan. Thus, the Austro-Hungarian troops attacked on a wider front (to satisfy the demand of the Germans) and with fewer forces. The result was as could be expected: in the Battle of Krasnik the 1st army, and in the Battle of Komarow the 4th army of the Austro-Hungarian forces defeated the Russians. But, as the Russian main force turned against the Austro-Hungarian troops between the San and Vistula Rivers, the 3rd and 4th armies lost two battles (Zloczow, Gnila Lipa); then, after heavy fighting around Lvov, the entire front was forced to retreat to the territory east and north of Krakow. To block the possible advance of the Russians in the direction of Budapest, only the 3rd army and an ad hoc organized force defended the territory south of the Vistula and on the eastern slopes of the Carpathian Mountains.
On November 11, the newly-appointed commander of the German eastern front, Colonel-General Paul von Hindenburg, first repelled the attack of the Russian 1st army against East-Prussia, then mounted a counterattack with the intention of encircling the right flank of the main Russian forces, "steamrolling" on the Austro-Hungarian sections of the Eastern front. The overwhelming Russian main force by that time had approached Krakow, while the Russian 8th army broke through the mountain passes of the Carpathian Mountains and reached the edges of the great plains in Hungary proper. The high command of the joint army decided to avert the danger represented by the Russian invasion of Hungary by joining the German plan, mounting an attack against the left flank of the Russian steamroller and thus, in cooperation with Hindenburg's forces, inflicting a decisive defeat on Russia. The over whelming majority of the forces which has to execute this plan were Hungarian: four Honved infantry divisions, two cavalry divisions, and several artillery regiments. Hungarian generals were also in key positions: General-Lieutenant Baron Gyula Nagy commanded a cavalry army corps comprising the 2nd Honved cavalry division, the 10th K.u.K. cavalry division, the 6th Landwehr cavalry division, and the Polish Legion of Joseph Pilsudski. Lieutenant-General Jozsef Roth commanded the 14th army corps, which was 7 1/2 division strong. Lieutenant-General Sandor Szurmay commanded the 38th Honved division and the Honved division of Lieutenant General Kornhaber. From regiment commander down, the commanders were all Hungarians in the Honved as well as in the K.u.K. units.
In order to encircle the left flank of the giant Russian Third Army (Plan 7), the "steamroller," the Austro-Hungarian 4th army first had to stop the Russian attack; then Lieutenant-General Roth's group had to attack in a northeasterly direction on the left flank of the attacking Russians. By December 3, the 4th army not only had stopped the Russian attack but had a1so mounted a counterattack south of Krakow and the Vistula River. The Roth group, with its right flank around the little village of Limanova, took up a position to execute the encirclement. The eastern flanks of this army were covered by the cavalry division of Lieutenant-General Nagy. On December 4, the Russian high commander, Alexel Alexandrovich Brusilov, recognized the danger of encirclement. He ordered the 16th and 24th army corps (5 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions) to discontinue the attack on the northeastern Carpathian section of the front, then to regroup and attack the right flank of the Roth group. The success of the original Austro-Hungarian plan depended now on the good performance of Lieutenant-General Nagy's Hungarian cavalry division.
The division, fighting in several regiment-size groups (supported by artillery), followed orders to attack the left flank and left rear of the Russian steamroller. After two successful days, the overwhelming Russian forces not only stopped the hussar attack, but on the third day of the battle began to force them to retreat. By that time the high command of the joint army had sent several additional infantry regiments to reinforce the cavalry troops. On December 4,the attack against the Russian left flank was renewed. To repel this attack, the Russians sent into action some of the troops (originally intended to sustain the steamroller momentum) against this offensive. Thus, the attack of the main Russian force was slowed down and finally halted. In the center of the large battlefield lay the village of Limanova. Here, the Russians hoped to break the resistance of the Austro-Hungarian right flank. But their repeated attacks gained very little territory. On December 10, the first divisions of the two Russian army corps which were to encircle the Austro-Hungarian left flank arrived. But, thanks to the heroic stand made by the Honved hussar and infantry regiments, there was no open flank to attack. To open up the now-continuous line, the Russians decided to break through the front at Limanova. They were late with this attempt, because the troops of Lieutenant General Szurmay, who was defending the mountain passes in the Carpathians, saw the withdrawal of the Russian forces and without waiting for orders began to fo1low them. On the last day of the battle, December 11, he launched a sweeping attack against the Russians. With this attack, he prevented the Russians from employing four divisions against the defenders of Limanova. Brussilov realized that, instead of a breakthrough, his forces were bogged down in a disadvantageous position and he ordered his armies to retreat behind the Dunajec River.
The victory at Limanova, which frustrated Russia's hopes of continuing their great offensive al1 the way to Berlin, also saved Hungary from the threat of a Russian invasion. General Ruski, commander of the Russian northwest front, summarized the impact of the battle at Limanova:
"This was the first significant defeat which the Russian troops suffered from the joint Austro-Hungarian army. We expected complete victory; instead we lost and this loss occurred on the most sensitive part of our entire front line. "

Sam-Nary said:

Look at the miles of territory gained in the Spring Offensive 1918. The Germans gained more ground in a shorter amount of time then the Allies had gained in various battles lasting months at at time. In places they gained about 35 miles of territory.

Compare that with the various miles gained in Allied assaults, there was a great difference. Prior to the 100 Days Offensive, no Allied attack gained anywhere near that ammount of territory...

And this was done with the Germans beginning to approach the limits of their endurance.

Total German Casualties in the Spring Offensive: just under 700,000
Total Allied Casualties in the Spring Offensive: over 800,000

The attack was carried with the last of Germany's strength in the hopes of ending the war before too many American units could enter. And tactically it was a German success, but Foch managed to strategically outthink Ludendorf, and as a result, the offensive accomplished little in the way of real success for the Germans. And after it, German exhaustion finally caught up with them, allowing for the rapid Allied advances of the 100 Days Offensive...

I mean, it's fairly easy to defeat a foe who's national economy is dead, his people are losing confidence in the government, and he's running out of men to even man the line...

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So taking their best and most elite units, training them to the peak of skill and giving them the best modern weapons the nation could produce they use them against undermanned and understrength British line units and...don't win.

then lose so much of their best remaining units that they collapse as a fighting force.

Its an interesting opinion on being the best when your entire stategy is a desperate gamble. I kind of wondered where Hitler got his Ardennes plan from and that might be it.

Dragon said:

I wouldn't say that I'm biased, if you ask any Canadian history buff (such as me) who had the best infantry in WW1 you'd get the same answer. Heck, they even teach these facts in Canadian schools.

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You know what, i'm kind of seeing a flaw in that argument.

unfortunately this topic has no point until we define what does "best infantry" and "world war I" means..

-obviously the entente infantry was the better if we take into account that they won the war
-on the other hand perhaps germans were better because in most battles they caused greater casulties to entente than entente caused them.
-germans were better because they were partly succesful against the enemy with less ammo, less food, less weapon, less men...
but the fact that entente had more food, more weapons, more ammunition could mean that they were the better ones.

-or which german army was "better"? the one in 1914 which reached Paris or in 1918 when they achieved less succes but their tactics, firepower, logistics were much more sophisticated and improved.

Nemowork said:

So taking their best and most elite units, training them to the peak of skill and giving them the best modern weapons the nation could produce they use them against undermanned and understrength British line units and...don't win.

then lose so much of their best remaining units that they collapse as a fighting force.

Its an interesting opinion on being the best when your entire stategy is a desperate gamble. I kind of wondered where Hitler got his Ardennes plan from and that might be it.

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Tactically the Spring Offensive WAS a German victory. The problem that Germany hit, was the victory achieved them nothing strategically. While I believe the German infantry were tactically superior, the matchup they faced was not the German army of 1918 against a bunch cavemen.

The British and the French both had good armies and managed to put together a strategic plan that was able to absorb the best Germany could through at them without being destroyed. The Allies suffered heavier casualties in the Spring Offensive, but they still had sizable forces in the areas where the Germans were attacking.

They had great tactics but lousy strategy. An issue of Military History covered this awhile back and made the explicit argument that the Germans developed the best tactical forces imaginable, but failed at every turn to harness them to a good strategy. Their strategic failures forced the Germans in both wars into fights that they couldn't afford and ultimately cost them the wars.

And in judging how good an infantry unit is, I'd look at what they can do tactically, not in the strategy that they are commanded to follow.

Larrey said:

They were tactically completely overmatched in the areas that really mattered late in the war: Heavy artillery and tanks. They achieved quality by building elite formations through stripping the not-so-elite, and then they used up this quality and a large chunk of their remaining manpower in the 1918 Michael offensive. In so doing they temporarily took back pretty much what they had already willingly given up in "Alberich" in 1917, i.e. the orderly strategic retreat to the "Hindenburg Line".

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Agreed, mostly as British industry had caught up with Germany's by 1918 and I've sen somewhere that before the 100 Days Offensive by the Allies began, the British had replaced all of the guns they had lost in the German Spring Offensive. And since the British and the French had spent four years shelling German trenches, by 1918, they'd finally got artillery bombardment down to a science.

Though, I'm not quite sure on the use of tanks in WWI. The British introduced them on the Somme and they performed some surprising feets, but much of this came because it was a new weapon. Eventually the Germans did catch on. The Cambrai offensive was initially succesful, but eventually the British tanks ran into a prepared German gun line of artillery and were stopped and forced to retreat. The perfection of tank tactics wouldn't come until after WWI.

But that doesn't change my opinion on who had the best infantry in WWI. If we wish to compare the armies as a whole in all aspects... things would be different.

Sam-Nary said:

Agreed, mostly as British industry had caught up with Germany's by 1918 and I've sen somewhere that before the 100 Days Offensive by the Allies began, the British had replaced all of the guns they had lost in the German Spring Offensive. And since the British and the French had spent four years shelling German trenches, by 1918, they'd finally got artillery bombardment down to a science.

Though, I'm not quite sure on the use of tanks in WWI. The British introduced them on the Somme and they performed some surprising feets, but much of this came because it was a new weapon. Eventually the Germans did catch on. The Cambrai offensive was initially succesful, but eventually the British tanks ran into a prepared German gun line of artillery and were stopped and forced to retreat. The perfection of tank tactics wouldn't come until after WWI.

But that doesn't change my opinion on who had the best infantry in WWI. If we wish to compare the armies as a whole in all aspects... things would be different.

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Well, I was more thinking along the lines of the French overtaking the Germans in heavy artillery in mid-1917, and fielding about four times the number of tanks th British did, while building and deploying more aircraft than either the British or the Germans, while effectively motorizing their army. This while also supplying the AEF with most of their artillery, and almost all of the planes, tanks, artillery and rolling stock the Americans were using.

It was a specific point of French pride that at any given time in 1918, the French army was serviced by a motor-pool of 40 000 operative trucks. Iirc the British figure was 20 000, and the Germans 10 000. When after the war made cognisant of this feature, Ludendorff apparently conceded that victory in the west might well have been largely due to French motor transport beating German rail.

The British industry had a very good-size chunk of its capacity engaged in furnishing the RN. The French industrial mobilisation was quite impressive, and since the British could be relied on holding up the naval side, the French could safely ignore theirs. That's why the French late in the war could beat even the British in the mechanical numbers-game. That, and the French clearly discerning that they way to fight this was precisely a mechanised war where numbers would make the difference. The Germans problem was that they found themselves unable to keep up industrially. Things like Sturmtruppen was simply a matter of making a virtue out of necessity. It was that, or concluding the war was already unwinable.

[Edit:] And for completeness sake it might of course also bear stating that the British putting effort into the RN allowed maintaining the blockade of Germany, which hampered the Germans industry to the extent that it found itself unable to match the Entente/Allies as the war progressed. It all fits together.

So much of it comes down to equpment. The Ruskies and Austro - Hungarian armies were badly ley down in that area.

For me the best troops of WWI were the storm troopers of I918. Yhey managed to reach open country beyond the Angl French lines/ no mean feat.

funakison said:

So much of it comes down to equpment. The Ruskies and Austro - Hungarian armies were badly ley down in that area.

For me the best troops of WWI were the storm troopers of I918. Yhey managed to reach open country beyond the Angl French lines/ no mean feat.

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Well, only at what was an unsustainable cost. It was a matter of bringing warm bodies to what the adversaries were developing into a primarily mechanical slam-fest. Impressive, but in the end these brave troops still ended up as just so much battle-field lubrication, and Germany still lost the war.

Not all divisions are created equal. Within an army there can be a large differences in training, equipment, espirt de corps, leadership, morale and overall combat effectiveness between divisions. So in that sense I think it can be hard to generalize when not all units were of the same quality.

If I had to choose I suppose Germany fielded the best Army overall, but not every German division was superior to their enemy equivalents.

Scaeva said:

Not all divisions are created equal. Within an army there can be a large differences in training, equipment, espirt de corps, leadership, morale and overall combat effectiveness between divisions. So in that sense I think it can be hard to generalize when not all units were of the same quality.

If I had to choose I suppose Germany fielded the best Army overall, but not every German division was superior to their enemy equivalents.

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exactly. The Russian guard armies were probably one of the best in the world but the average Russian soldier was not that well equipped nor trained.

Dragon said:

I wouldn't say that I'm biased, if you ask any Canadian history buff (such as me) who had the best infantry in WW1 you'd get the same answer. Heck, they even teach these facts in Canadian schools.

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Oh, what the heck. I would say us Americans were the best. Now i don't think i am biased either, but well, heck that is exactly how it sounds. Honestly American infantry came in too late to adequately judge how good they were. Suffice too say, they took their cues and organizations from the French military.

Seriously, i would have to say it is a close one between all of the belligerents, but in the end of the analysis it is a toss up between either the German infantry or the UK Tommies and the commonwealth infantry, specifically, the Australian digger.