Did the Germans really have the best tanks? Were German Generals and tank crews really supermen but for Hitler?

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That is one of the German generals' three excuses after the war for why they lost, whereas actually Allied numerical or material superiority was not so great and many of the Germans' production problems were self-inflicted. There are popular myths like "it took 4 or 5 T-34s or Shermans to take out a Panther." I think some people on the Internet are trying to over-compensate for the myth of German superweapons by presenting German tanks as bad, whereas the majority view among experts seems to be that German tanks in the early war were pretty good, but good in ways other than having the biggest motor, the thickest armour, and the loudest gun.

Its just like how at the start of the war the Germans had rationally limited their tank inventory for a few, well-designed models compared to the somewhat chaotic British and French tank fleets, but by 1944 they were spreading their resources across all kind of wild and crazy designs while the Allies had standardized on a few.
Only from the summer of 1942 to the end of the Autumn 42, 3-4 months or so, can the Germans state they had the best tanks during WW2. This was with the introduction of the Panzer IVF2, with the longer 75mm KwK40, and the Tiger 1.

However, the earlier PzIV was probably the second best tank of the war 39-41, after the A10, and remained competitive throughout the war.

The Germans started WW2 with the PzI, PzII, PzIII, PzIV, 35t and 38t tanks, plus the original PzV.

The British had the Lt Mk VI, A9, A10, A13, Matilda 1 and Matilda 2.

The French had a fair few more. Se page 10. FRENCH ARMAMENT by David Lehmann December 5, PDF Free Download

FCM-36
Renault R35/39/40
Hotchkiss H39
Char D1
Char D2
Char B1/B1bis.

Each of these three nations really had 6 different types of tanks, available to it, ignoring truly obsolete French models, such as the WW1 FT-17. However, it should be noted that the Germans intended to have only two for battle, ie the PzIII and PzIV, while the British wanted one cruiser and one infantry tank. Later, the Soviets wanted one medium and one heavy, so all nations were, in principle, initially thinking along the same lines. It was actually the Germans who then intended to have three models, with a heavy to counter well protected tanks fought during the Battle of France, but then reverted to Soviet practice of one heavy and one medium, on paper.
 
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True plus at the battle of Arracourt the Panthers had crews that turned their sides to the American Sherman's and TDs and that didn't work out. Perhaps and maybe @Nick the Noodle would agree that by say mid 1943 or definitely by June 1944 most Panzer crews were on the young side and not as well trained as the allied crews. Plus Panzer logistics were difficult at best . It wasn't a fair fight but it's not the allied commanders job to ensure a fair fight, quite the opposite.
Leftyhunter
It was the lack of fuel that hampered training. I'll try to find a source.
 
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It's from a website, so how accurate the following is, I don't know?
While not as extensive as the training given to tank crews earlier in the war, instruction for Panther crews was nonetheless excellent. Enlisted personnel had to pass an intensive four-month program that emphasized on hands-on practice. Every man had to first train as a driver/mechanic, including lessons in advanced engine maintenance, before moving on to other crew functions. By end of the four-month program each man was proficient in all crew roles and an expert in his assigned position. Soldiers that had shown promise during this stage were selected for additional training as NCOs or officers. Follow-up programs were heavy on the tactical theory and lasted between six and nine months.

Having completed their basic training, graduates were sent to ‘replacement’ battalions within Germany. Here they were formed into platoons and assigned to the tank crews that they would likely remain with throughout their combat service. This was not the end of the training, however. While awaiting combat assignments, crews were rigorously put through their paces, having to carry out constant maneuver and gunnery exercises, often at night or in low-light conditions. The culmination of all this training was the ‘battle run’ – a combined maneuver and live-fire exercise that required crews to engage a series of pop-up targets (some of them moving) at ranges of 800m to 2000m.
Panther training film.


At c2.00 min mark, it is stated the gunner has located a target. He must have been very lucky, since only the commander has any vision when buttoned down.
 
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Yes, tanks areinteresting but only one bit. Its everything that matters, and the Soviet everything stopped their Caucasis adventures, and the Wallied everything started bombing refineries.
True, but it's worth being knowledgeable in at least one element of history imho :). I've chosen tanks. My library has well over a hundred quality books, probably over 200, and when you add in pdf's etc, maybe over 300. Even then, there are some notable deficiencies. I don't have one single book dedicated to the King Tiger as an example. OTOH, I do have now rare works, such as The IS Tanks by Mikhail Baryatinskiy, the price of which is now very silly.

 
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True, but it's worth being knowledgeable in at least one element of history imho :). I've chosen tanks. My library has well over a hundred quality books, probably over 200, and when you add in pdf's etc, maybe over 300. Even then, there are some notable deficiencies. I don't have one single book dedicated to the King Tiger as an example. OTOH, I do have now rare works, such as The IS Tanks by Mikhail Baryatinskiy, the price of which is now very silly.


I now have this image of Nick.
cropped-gandalfs-library.jpg


:cheersbeer:
 
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Back to the topic, and without starting a new thread, I'd argue the US, once it entered, had the best tank of the war: the M4.
It has the advantages of the T34 without the disadvantages.

*Reliability engineered to death. As Moran notes, everything was tested for multiple environments.
*Mass production on the T34 scale but able to last longer then 300km (because it had to).
*Ease of maintenance and standardization was a factor in design.
*Good crew vision. good crew optics (everyone had periscopes). Decent sighting optics for turret.
*Three man hull and radios in every vehicle.
*Good armor to the front and decent to the side.
*Good overall gun for use against multiple opponents. 75 mm round had good HE fill and was decent for antiarmor against most opponents.
*Good crew survavability, especially with later models: big hatches, wet stowage.
*Able to be upgraded with additional armor, gun, multiple engine options, tank destroyer and artillery variants based on hull.

Some could even float! (well sort of, in a pond., but not when you needed it)
It just needed an integrated tea kettle.
 
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It's from a website, so how accurate the following is, I don't know?

Panther training film.


At c2.00 min mark, it is stated the gunner has located a target. He must have been very lucky, since only the commander has any vision when buttoned down.

Interesting that the Panzer crews were well trained but US veteran tankers from the battle of Arracourt we're puzzled that the Panthers turned their sides to them making them easy pickings. In the two largest tank on tank combat on the Western Front Dompaire and Arracourt the French and American tankers more then held their own against the Panther using the 75mm Sherman and the M-10 TD.
So the Panther was arguably superior to the T-34/85 due to comfort/ eronomics ,having a basket for the turret vs standing on an ammo crate and of course a poor heater making it difficult in the winter to escape vis the hatches.
Of course only 35 percent reliability, 6k Panthers divided by three fronts vs 29,400 T-34/85 on just one front with 80 to 90 percent reliability gives the edge to the T-34/85.
Soviet crews loved the Panther if they could capture it intact but the comparily spacious ride only lasted so long.
Leftyhunter
 
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Back to the topic, and without starting a new thread, I'd argue the US, once it entered, had the best tank of the war: the M4.
It has the advantages of the T34 without the disadvantages.

*Reliability engineered to death. As Moran notes, everything was tested for multiple environments.
*Mass production on the T34 scale but able to last longer then 300km (because it had to).
*Ease of maintenance and standardization was a factor in design.
*Good crew vision. good crew optics (everyone had periscopes). Decent sighting optics for turret.
*Three man hull and radios in every vehicle.
*Good armor to the front and decent to the side.
*Good overall gun for use against multiple opponents. 75 mm round had good HE fill and was decent for antiarmor against most opponents.
*Good crew survavability, especially with later models: big hatches, wet stowage.
*Able to be upgraded with additional armor, gun, multiple engine options, tank destroyer and artillery variants based on hull.

Some could even float! (well sort of, in a pond., but not when you needed it)
It just needed an integrated tea kettle.

This not a primary source but a nice note concerning Soviet views of M4's.
The Soviets referred to the tank – regardless of its armament – by its official US Army nomenclature of M4, or in Russian, M Chetyrye – shortened to Emcha. Their crews were referred to as Emchisti.


The Emchas enjoyed a much better reputation than the earlier Lend-Lease tanks such as the American M3 Medium or the British Matilda. They were liked by their crews who were grateful for the Sherman’s relative comfort and general habitability and also appreciated by the higher echelons for their mechanical reliability. These qualities were somewhat lacking in the T-34 and contributed to the Emcha’s efficiency during a campaign. This goes some way to explaining why an elite unit such as the 9th Guards Mechanized Corps had three of its brigades equipped with Shermans and not the locally developed T-34. As another example, the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps traded its powerful T-34/85s for M4A2s in late 1944 in preparation for the final offensive into the heart of Germany. Mounted in the commander’s cupola, the .50 calibre M2 heavy machine gun was much appreciated in street fighting and for anti-aircraft defence. Although it was generally awkward for the crew to operate, the gun was easily dismounted to allow the accompanying infantry to use it. Mechanically, the twin diesel engine had plentiful torque and could be clutched separately, allowing a very quiet advance at low speed especially if the tank ran on rubber tracks which the T- 34 could not do. The overall longer life of the Emcha’s tracks was also an advantage, surviving roughly twice as long as Soviet tracks, with the rubber variants capable of giving up to 5,000 km service. This was however in favourable conditions and terrain and the Russians found that the metal tracks particularly suffered from loss of grip on snow and ice and that in extremely high temperatures – such as those encountered during the summer of 1944 while crossing Romania and in August 1945 in Manchuria – the Emcha’s suspension was prone to overheating and damage, with the rubber block tracks and roadwheel tyres disintegrating.


It was commonly believed that the diesel fuel used with the M4A2 presented a lower fire risk if the tank was hit and this was undoubtedly one reason for the type’s popularity. Tests carried out by the US Army however established that the high flammability of the Sherman was due to inadequate ammunition stowage and had no link to the type of engine fuel used. This problem was addressed by the introduction of a system referred to as Wet Stowage whereby the tank’s ammunition racks were moved from the side sponsons to the hull floor and placed inside a protective, water filled bin. If the ammunition racks were penetrated the water would, in theory, prevent a fire from igniting the ammunition. In practice, the whole system was rendered useless if rounds were left scattered about the hull floor as they often were. Only the 76mm variant of the Emcha received this modification.


Another advantage was the Emcha’s five man crew which left the commander free to control and observe. This efficient combination was not introduced in the T-34 until the production of the 85mm armed model in 1944. Added to this were the excellent American radios which allowed for efficient command and control. Despite its advantages, the Soviets complained of a number of shortcomings in the Emcha in comparison to the T-34. Most notably were the inferior ballistic qualities of its non-sloped armour, its high profile, high centre of gravity, its lack of adequate flotation – caused by the narrow tracks – and its wider turning radius. The claim however that the T-34 was better armed should be regarded sceptically. The Emcha’s 75mm main gun was roughly equal in penetrating power to the Soviet 76.2mm while its High Explosive (HE) performance was vastly superior – in fact, the US Army’s 75mm HE shell was in a class of its own. The armour piercing capacity of the US 76mm gun was at least comparable to the Soviet 85mm as was proven in the Korean War – and the HE capability equal, in spite of the larger calibre of the Russian weapon. The American optical sights were also superior to the Soviet types, although it is probable that the stabilized gun of the American tank was not often utilised or even used to its full potential as it required extensive training and maintenance. And as regards the latter, the Soviets did indeed have a legitimate complaint, with few spare parts other than complete engines being delivered, necessitating such desperate measures as the cannibalisation of battlefield wrecks in order to keep vehicles running.
 
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At Arrancourt, weren't the German tanks in Panzer Brigades? The Tank Brigade was inexperienced and was basically just out of training., zone would expect new tank crews to use bad tactics. The Americans were from the 4th Armor Division, Patton's favorites.

Pruitt
 
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At Arrancourt, weren't the German tanks in Panzer Brigades? The Tank Brigade was inexperienced and was basically just out of training., zone would expect new tank crews to use bad tactics. The Americans were from the 4th Armor Division, Patton's favorites.

Pruitt
That maybe but if said knew crews were well trained and at a minimum had experienced officers then in theory the Panzer crews would've of taken a beating. Perhaps @Nick the Noodle would know if by at least mid 1944 Panzer training had to be severely curtailed to replace increasingly heavy Panzer crew losses.
Leftyhunter
 
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That maybe but if said knew crews were well trained and at a minimum had experienced officers then in theory the Panzer crews would've of taken a beating. Perhaps @Nick the Noodle would know if by at least mid 1944 Panzer training had to be severely curtailed to replace increasingly heavy Panzer crew losses.
Leftyhunter
One of the problems faced by the Germans was that tactics useful against the Soviets failed against the W Allies.
Consider this document concerning the experiences of Balck and Von Mellenthin on the Eastern Front.
Note how they state they use armour and infantry separately. Soviet tactics could be less than sophisticated, and lower echelon RKKA afv units by 1944, usually only contained one specific type of vehicle. This is easier on the logistical train, but less effective in combat. You can counter advancing unsupported tanks, with a mere few of your own.
W Ally AD's have an equal balance of tank and infantry battalions, and much more flexible. They also have decent recce units, a lack of which is why the Germans failed so spectacularly at Arracourt, as the Panzer flailed blindly in the fog. By this period of the war, German recce units, were usually used as a tactical reserve, and not in their traditional role.

USA: Cavalry Reconnaissance Reconnaissance, Mechanized, Armored Division, US Army, 06.06.44
GB: Reconnaissance Regiment, Armoured Division, 1944

German:
In addition to its primary role, the armored reconnaissance battalion was frequently employed as a mobile reserve force, particularly when its parent division was on the defensive. When so tasked it was usually organized as a battle group (Kampfgruppe) with additional units attached, e.g. a tank company or an assault gun battery. This practice of cross-attaching divisional sub-units to create task forces for specific mission was a standard practice of the German Army.
 
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Until this time new Panzer crews were being posted to veteran units. The new crew could be spread out among old crews and one would have mixed experienced crews. This would have been a boon for the older units as they received replacement crews and tanks. In a five man crew, the main gun loader was usually the least experienced member. I would offer an experienced driver would know better than to turn his side to enemy tanks.

Pruitt
 
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Until this time new Panzer crews were being posted to veteran units. The new crew could be spread out among old crews and one would have mixed experienced crews. This would have been a boon for the older units as they received replacement crews and tanks. In a five man crew, the main gun loader was usually the least experienced member. I would offer an experienced driver would know better than to turn his side to enemy tanks.

Pruitt
At Arracourt, it was advancing into the unknown in fog which was the killer. Recce units should have been out in front.
 
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Note how they state they use armour and infantry separately. Soviet tactics could be less than sophisticated, and lower echelon RKKA afv units by 1944, usually only contained one specific type of vehicle. This is easier on the logistical train, but less effective in combat. You can counter advancing unsupported tanks, with a mere few of your own.
W Ally AD's have an equal balance of tank and infantry battalions, and much more flexible. They also have decent recce units, a lack of which is why the Germans failed so spectacularly at Arracourt, as the Panzer flailed blindly in the fog. By this period of the war, German recce units, were usually used as a tactical reserve, and not in their traditional role.
One professional historian has noted that after about the winter of 1942/1943, Axis forces never ruined a major Allied land operation in the west. They could stop Allied advances but not knock whole corps and armies out of the war. Postwar critics often accused the Western Allied armies of not being aggressive enough, but their approach seemed to save them from the inevitable German counterattack (and they still won). Meanwhile the Soviets were bolder but sometimes got massacred in their moment of triumph.
 
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Let me repeat:

Is it really that difficult to find usual combat ranges from the document I provided?

https://www.alternatewars.com/BBOW/Ballistics/Term/ORO-T-117_Allied_Tank_Casualties_WW2.pdf

If you click on the side, it's page no 21, which has a diagram showing usual combat ranges.
In Africa it's 900 yds, Europe 800 yds and Italy 300 yds.

Please click on the link, go to item 21, and the official information is there. I'm pointing to an actual, once top secret, source. That's better than simply quoting from a book.


reading the actual document it stresses there are subejctive numbers, and further says on page 15

"The overall rnage of 800m is prorblay higher than the actual figure."

So the Figure for Europe of 800 yards is motslikly overstated and teh atcual diatnce was much smaller,

It is still a 1944-45 and not nesscarily representaove of 1940 encounters.
 
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? You mean 36mm@30 at 500m. Remember, that figure is the absolute best it can penetrate. Weapons in the field rarely perform as well as in trials.

The table below states 29mm at 500m.

The problem with these tables is that you don't know all the aspects involved. Not all armour is equal. It's well known that German armour became substandard once they lost access to certain materials, such as molybdenum, resulting in Panther glacis plates cracking when hit by rounds that should not have been normally able to penetrate. Another example is the turret on the Churchill. The 89mm on the Churchill IV was superior to the 89mm on the Churchill III. Early Sherman tank armour was too soft, and IS-2 armour too hard as further examples. Essentially, it comes down to several components including bhn (hardness of metal), heat treatment, and the crystalline structure of the metal itself.

The quality of the armour is not just down to the quality of materials. US tank armour in 42 and 43 was of variable quality, as afv production ramped up from a few hundred, to tens of thousands per year. The same was true in Britain late 1940-42 as panic after Dunkirk saw a huge rise in tank production as well, quantity taking precedence over quality.

Another element is face hardened vs rolled homogenous armour. Against uncapped shells/shot, or if the armour is very thin, you want the former. When facing capped shells, or if you have thick armour, you want RHA, not FHA.

AP tables are a good place to start, but don't tell the whole story. Concerning this saga, the 5RTR being very pleased with the quality of, what should have been substandard, A10 armour. It should also be noted that for a time, the Germans added 30mm spaced armour to their PzIIIH's over much of their frontal arc. This effectively made them immune to the uncapped 2 pdr shot at basically all ranges.

Your figures did not take into account the composite armour of the A10 which one could reasonable expect to perform somewhat worse the homologous amour plate,.

As you say depends on the quality of teh amour and the A10 was know to be constructed on two riveted plates.

So you claims about the A10 being impervious to PzIII a t standard bnattle rnages ins suspect on both counts, the standard battle distance even by your own source is somewhat less, and the A10 armour could reasonably expected to perform somewhat worse.
 
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Your figures did not take into account the composite armour of the A10 which one could reasonable expect to perform somewhat worse the homologous amour plate,.

As you say depends on the quality of teh amour and the A10 was know to be constructed on two riveted plates.

So you claims about the A10 being impervious to PzIII a t standard bnattle rnages ins suspect on both counts, the standard battle distance even by your own source is somewhat less, and the A10 armour could reasonably expected to perform somewhat worse.
From Jentz, Tank Combat p18.
Cruiser Tanks Mk II - These were considered the best cruiser tank in Egypt at the time of the operations. The particular type of armour used...was found to be most effective, and its resistance to all sorts of attacks was very much higher than expected. Mechanically the tank was very reliable indeed, and great distances were covered without trouble.
This is from a report shortly after the campaign.

Tanks faced are: WW2 Italian Tanks info

The tank/AT gun most likely to be faced was this:
On paper it penetrates the A10 at all usual combat ranges, and is more powerful than the 37mm KwK/PaK 36. Obviously it wasn't doing so.
The fact that the A10 was obviously resisting such hits from the Italian gun, given the praise for this cruiser, means it is even less likely to be harmed by the less powerful German weapon.

It is a fact that two plates cemented together are not as resistant to one thick plate. However, it is clear from the reports, that the quality of British armour plate at that time was of an extremely high standard, more than offsetting this usual deficiency. As I've detailed in an above post, armour is more than just thickness of plate.

As for combat ranges, 800m in Europe is derived by visibility, not weapons used. You will note that ranges are shorter in Italy, for this reason, as the weapon systems used by both sides are the same. I've provided the actual original Official Top Secret report that states this average range. You need to prove it is wrong.
 
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In the report from 1981 which Nick linked, I notice that generals Balck and von Mellenthin say that when a Pz IV crew set out to destroy a T-34 "we could do it at 1500-2000 metres, (but) very often we killed them at only 200-300 metres distance" (p. 45) That is almost an order of magnitude between "maximum feasable" and "very often". So I'd take those average, late-war engagement distances with a grain of salt even for the late war when tanks were much more capable than in 1940.

I don't recall any of the Italian tankers in Walker's Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts complaining about their 47 mm gun until they encountered Grants and Shermans.

Edit: I notice that at minute 8:00 of Hillary Doyle makes approving noises when Nicholas Moran says that the Pz III was the best tank in the world at the start of WW II. I think I will have access to the Tank Museum's book on the Pz III later in 2022.
 

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