HMS Macedonian vs USS United States – October 25, 1812

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Quivera
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In 1807, Stephan Decatur has given command of the dishonored (The Leopard Affair) & bad star frigate USS Chesapeake. He was already famous due his exploits involving the burning of the captured USS Philadelphia in Tripoli harbor & hand to hand combat aboard various Tripolitan gunboats. He was already respected by the crew that hoped he could somehow let them regain their dignity & honor lost to HMS Leopard. Much of the crew that had suffered the indignity were still aboard & Decatur saw fit to refine & focus their anger & desire for revenge through strict regime & an intensive & ongoing degree of training & gunnery drills. He turned the vessel & crew into a top notch warship over the next couple of years, as if in total defiance to USS Chesapeakes bad star.

In 1809, the new SecNav, Paul Hamilton placed him in command of the big sister USS United States – then nearing completion of a 2 year refit at the Washington Navy Yard – and ordered him to ready her for sea. Most of USS Cheasapekes crew jumped at the chance to move up to the larger sister & greater command with him. They could not wait to abandon USS Cheasapekes unlucky reputation and also avoid the chaos of another reorganization as surely the next skipper would insist & require.

SecNav Hamilton directed Decatur & Isaac Hull to join John Rogers first squadron in New York. USS Constitution barely escaped a British squadron giving chase & got into Boston too late as Rodgers & Decatur had already sailed from NY. This had the benefit of freeing Hull to act independently & allowed for his defeat of HMS Guerriere while the first of four voyages of Rogers squadron was unproductive & very likely had Stephan Decatur simply chomping at the bit as Hull in USS Constitution achieved the high honor of victory over HMS Guerriere – the first American Naval victory of the entire war.

Upon return from the first cruise of Rogers squadron, Decatur became enamoured by a new plan espoused by SecNav Hamilton. Of the 6 Live Oak super frigates designed by Joshua Humphreys, the first three were rated 44s, (USS President, USS United States, USS Constitution) The final three were rated 36-38s. (USS Congress, USS Constellation, USS Chesapeake) SecNav Hamilton envisaged a flagged three ship squadron around each of the 3 big sisters. Decaturs would include USS United States as his flagship, his old ship, USS Chesapeake, & the brig USS Argus. USS Chesapeake was not ready to sail & USS Constitution required refit.

On October 8th, 1812, both John Rogers, with his flag in USS President, with USS Congress as consort & Stephen Decaturs squadrons both left port & sailed in concert for a few days. They then parted company & a few days later Stephen Decatur directed Captain Sinclair to sail independently – contrary to SecNav Hamiltons desire. USS Argus sailed east capturing six valuable merchantmen, returning to port January 3, 1813. His cruise involved a harried chase wherein USS Argus was literally stripped underway & cleared of all non-critical cargo, fittings, anchors, boats… in order to give the pursuing British squadron the slip, at one point. But this too is another story.

Decatur took USS United States to cruise between the Azores & the Canary Islands – an area known to often be the station of various British warships. He was eagerly in search of a target rich environ & was quite sure he would find what he sought. On October 25, he found what he was searching for when the tops of HMS Macedonian were sighted. She was a finely constructed 2 year old frigate under the command of John Carden, who was also seeking a worthy antagonist. Carden was in fact looking for USS Essex, thought to be cruising in the area.

Of particular note is that USS Essex was known by the British to be unusually armed with heavy short range carronades & but a small battery of light long guns. USS Essex would have to rapidly close range to bring her heavy main guns into effective range. Cardens mis-identification was likely his most fatal of mistakes, but would probably not have changed the outcome much, regardless. A proper ID would have changed John Cardens tactics quite a bit. As it was, he sought to keep the range open, using his long 18-pounders to cut up USS Essex rigging to reduce her helm, and then close herself using canister & dismantling shot for a classic yardarm-to-yardarm. Against the faster USS Essex, this may well have worked. But his antagonist was not USS Essex.

This vessel showed no sign of any hurry to close the range. Of even more concern to him was that the enemys 24-pound round shot was rapidly coming aboard & smashing his ship long before the grape & canister in his spar deck guns, or even his long 18-pounders could reach his opponent. He became readily aware that this certainly was not USS Essex, quite likely to late. The gunners of this antagonist seemed to fire on target with a vengeance. They were – stick by stick – taking out the masts of HMS Macedonian & putting great holes in her sides. He could not have known that most of these vengeful gunners were still mindful of their humiliation aboard USS Chesapeake at the hand of HMS Leopard five years previous.

Decaturs emphasis upon intensive training & drill, combined with their own deeply seated desire to regain their honor had sharpened the blade falling upon Cardens command. USS United States 1st Lt. was William Henry Allen. The same Wm. Allen that had carried – bare handed – the coal that touched off USS Chesapeakes only reply against HMS Leopard. He & Decatur had drilled their men often & well. The crew relished the drills hoping one day to regain what was taken from them. It was paying off.
Stephan Decatur fought the battle much as his opponent John Carden had planned to fight it. He avoided the urge to charge in for a yardarm-to-yardam, choosing to use his greater range & the excellence of his gun crews to avoid foolish loss of life in his own crew & to avoid needless damage to his flagship. He fought smartly. By the time Carden knew of his tactical error, he tried desperately to close range, but with his standing rigging shot away and but a stump left of his main mast he never the less tried unsuccessfully to crawl to his antagonist. Almost completely undamaged, USS United States sailed about him at will. Holding a frantic war council, HMS Macedonians 1st Lt. was the only one that wanted to continue the fight. All others agreed that would be useless self-destruction to do so. At this, John Carden struck his colors, feeling that he had betrayed his trust as a captain in the British Navy. Much as Dacres in HMS Guerriere before him.

The captives of HMS Macedonian were treated with utmost care & respect – unlike the treatment meted out to many of the former USS Chesapeake crew – now in USS United States – by HMS Leopard. British losses were 36 dead and 68 wounded. American losses were 7 dead and 5 wounded.
At this point, Stephan Decatur realized he now had what Issac Hull did not. A very new, strong & refitable prize in HMS Macedonian. He understood well the nations need for not only the material… but the psychological victory in the war up to that point. USS United States lay alongside for four days making their prize seaworthy for sail. He then cut his intended cruise short to lead such a worthy prize victoriously into port. On December 4, 1812, Decatur reached New London Connecticut with his prize. Upon his arrival he discovered that there was to be a Naval Ball held in honor of Hull & the officers of USS Constitution & their victory at sea, in Washington a few days hense. A perfect occasion to be climaxed by the presentation by Issac Hull of HMS Guerrieres huge battle flag to Dolly Madison. It was a highly prideful & glorious occasion.

The Navy Secretaries son – Archibald Hamilton – was one of Decaturs officers & was dispatched with HMS Macedonians largest battle flag to the event with instructions of timing & behavior upon his arrival. According to the Niles’ Weekly Register, “about nine o’ clock a rumor was spread through the assembly that Lieutenant Hamilton, the son of the Secretary of the Navy, had reached the house, the bearer of dispatches from Commodore Decatur and the colors of the Macedonian. He was escorted to the festive hall [and] the flag of the Macedonian was borne into the hall by Captains Hull and Stewart.”

The young Hamilton, smelling foul and of horses from the frantic 4 day journey, strode into the hall, centered with HMS Guerrieres Battle Flag, surrounded by the President, First ...., Cabinet Ministers , dignitaries, socialites, & their wives, of all stripe dressed in their finest, and was followed by the rolled prize of HMS Macedonians Battle Flag upon the shoulders of Decaturs comrades. Equal in size, it was spread by Hull & Stewart before Dolly – beside the prize of HMS Guerriere – and the Navy’s stock could not have been higher at that moment & at that delirious gathering.

The US Navy had proven its metal & it drove home the vast import of Sea Power to a young nations people upon their learning of it.

The remaining question is what think you of its impact upon the 'invincible' morale of the British Navy?

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The remaining question is what think you of its impact upon the 'invincible' morale of the British Navy?


The royal Navy knew the new ships the Americans called frigates were in reality the approximate equivalent of the then obsolecent 4th rate line-of-battle-ships, and there was no dishonour in surrendering to a far superior opponent. Fortunes of war. However, capturing or sinking one of these "monsters" would have been the ambition of many an RN frigate captain and crew. The prize or blood money would have been considerable, so many a captain tried his luck regardless.
 
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The remaining question is what think you of its impact upon the 'invincible' morale of the British Navy?​



The single combat victories by the U.S. frigates in 1812 did cause quite a stir in Britain. In the preceding 20 years of naval conflicts, primarily with France, the British Navy had sustained only one defeat in one-on-one encounters between vessels of like size and armament.

The impact upon morale is best answered perhaps by the British reaction to these defeats, which was ultimately to issue orders that their own frigates were to avoid single combat with the American vessels. I dont know the exact dates that these orders were issued or received but they were executed and the British Navy sought thereafter safety in numbers of which they had a surplus.

The effects upon British morale were tempered by claims of "cheating" and such against the Americans because their "frigate" carried 6 mores guns than the British equivalent and on average displaced roughly 200 more tons of water.

At the end of the day the British certainly knew that whatever short-term defeats had been endured they held an overwhelming position of power by sheer fleet size and this must have been transmitted down through the ranks to assauge any morale deficiences.
 
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The single combat victories by the U.S. frigates in 1812 did cause quite a stir in Britain. In the preceding 20 years of naval conflicts, primarily with France, the British Navy had sustained only one defeat in one-on-one encounters between vessels of like size and armament.

Really? The only one I've come across was the capture of HMS Junon by two Fench Frigates in 1806, care to supply details?

The impact upon morale is best answered perhaps by the British reaction to these defeats, which was ultimately to issue orders that their own frigates were to avoid single combat with the American vessels. I dont know the exact dates that these orders were issued or received but they were executed and the British Navy sought thereafter safety in numbers of which they had a surplus.

Well that's one view. When the orders were published on the West Indies station, they caused the frigate crews to threaten mutiny if they were forced to carry them out. Really sounds like Bitish Naval morale cracking at the seams. :rolleyes::D

The effects upon British morale were tempered by claims of "cheating" and such against the Americans because their "frigate" carried 6 mores guns than the British equivalent and on average displaced roughly 200 more tons of water.

American ships were bigger, faster, better armed and due to their small numbers crewed by the best, most experienced seamen available (including many British deserters). That's a historical fact, but it was accepted as "just one of those things" by the Royal Navy. I'm unaware of any Naval accusations of "cheating".

When the two sides met on equal terms, it took no more than 15minutes for HMS Shannon to capture the USS Chesapeake.
 
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Really? The only one I've come across was the capture of HMS Junon by two Fench Frigates in 1806, care to supply details?



Well that's one view. When the orders were published on the West Indies station, they caused the frigate crews to threaten mutiny if they were forced to carry them out. Really sounds like Bitish Naval morale cracking at the seams. :rolleyes::D



American ships were bigger, faster, better armed and due to their small numbers crewed by the best, most experienced seamen available (including many British deserters). That's a historical fact, but it was accepted as "just one of those things" by the Royal Navy. I'm unaware of any Naval accusations of "cheating".

When the two sides met on equal terms, it took no more than 15minutes for HMS Shannon to capture the USS Chesapeake.


In his "The Naval War of 1812" Theodore Roosevelt refers to the French 24-gun "Bayonnaise" capture of the British 32-gun "Ambuscade" on 14 Dec. 1798.

What was the outcome of the threats to mutiny if the orders were carried out to avoid single ship combat ?

I think the claims of "cheating" were not made by the British Navy but in the popular press.

The "Shannon" vs "Chesapeake" encounter would make a great movie. Yes, the fight was very short but one of the bloodiest of the war. And as Roosevelt states "the Shannon fought better than the Chesapeake".
 
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In his "The Naval War of 1812" Theodore Roosevelt refers to the French 24-gun "Bayonnaise" capture of the British 32-gun "Ambuscade" on 14 Dec. 1798.

What was the outcome of the threats to mutiny if the orders were carried out to avoid single ship combat ?

Thanks, overlooked that one. Embarassing for the Ambuscade, still we got her back later. :)

The threats came to nothing, as everyone knew the penalty for mutiny was death. It was recorded more as a protest and to illustrate the sailor's disdain for such "cowardly" orders.
 
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Quivera
Ahh, USS Chesapeake... Sir Philip Broke was one of the finest Skippers in the British arsenal. An expert in calculating drill & tactics. Even a bit of baiting, as well. He would muster his crew to attention quite regularly & present them with a problem, fostering & encouraging each to calculate solutions, not just as individuals, but as various elements & as a crew overall.

The man knew the value of crack shot Marines in his tops, the potential inherent in allowing his crews to seek a decision by capitalizing on developing events as they unfolded without being so fully constrained by a doctrine so cast in stone as to disallow independent problem solving in the midst & heat of battle - to a much greater extent than his adversaries.

James Lawrence was a fool & fought his ship as one against HMS Shannon. The victory for Sir Philip Broke was not one of superior ships, it was one of a vastly superior British Captain & crew over a much less skilled skipper & crew with no real element of cohesive training upon which to draw in their midst. USS Chesapeake was never in a sufficient or respectable state of readiness under Lawrence, as much due to the best of the crew having left with Decateur for a ship that did not seemingly have a 'dark star' over its masts. USS Chesapeake - other than under Decatuer - did indeed seem to never be far from bad luck. (I say this believing in no such thing as a bad luck ship)

You'll find no disdain or even slightly ill opinion of Sir Philip Broke from me. I think so highly of the man that I would go so far as to surmise that if Broke - alone - had taken command of USS Chesapeake even 3 weeks before the match - leaving intact the crew he had trained aboard HMS Shannon - he was so adept at his craft that he might well have been able to have defeated HMS Shannon just by his person & expertise at training & drill - yes, he was THAT good!

He is indeed quite lucky that he, himself, survived from the saber blade to the head received during the engagement which effectively ended his career in command at sea. Somewhat permanently disfigured, he did not seek nor remain in retirement & very much joined in the official endeavour to advance the establishment of far greater training regimes in the Royal Navy. Though I have never been able to determine - with any certainty - to what extent he might actually have been able to fully maintain his previous effect in that role as he had so expertly & eloquently fostered & produced at sea in his crews, Sir Philip Broke was by no means ever anything less than exceptional.

Incidentally, one can still walk the decks & touch the live oak timbers of USS Chesapeake... She was later broken up at Gosport & her timber used to create or rebuild the still existing Chesapeake Mill in Wickham. (The Chesapeake Mill is now not functional, but is instead a gift shop) It is not difficult - when one knows it - to see the various elements & other tell tales signs in the structure if one visits. One can, if they call ahead & but properly ask, be allowed to 'look around' beyond the general areas of the shop now in business there.

As to the 'Constitution' class, they were more properly known by all that ever engaged or graced their decks more properly as Super Frigates - which they very much were - and bore no resemblance in structural framing to any warship then afloat - most certainly any sort of 'ship of the line', 4th rate or otherwise. In fact, their framing was very much based upon that of a particular type of barn then becoming somewhat useful in North America. That bit alone lent itself greatly to their inherent strength beyond just the American Live Oak used extensively in their construct.

No, more accurately, one could make a fair argument that they would well be best considered as some of the earliest Cruisers in their abilities, attributes, strength, means & speed. They could, in fact, & did most often scout/sortie alone, & they could generally always outrun anything that they could not outgun & run down most anything that they could match or outgun - how the ship was fought always being a matter which could render a decision in any battle.

It should also be noted... HMS Shannon was never again anything approaching the stout vessel she once was, even though she did remain on the roles & continued to serve the Royal Navy further in various capacities. She certainly did not survive the battle without her own serious damage & she was no more or less a wreck than the prize she won in USS Chesapeake. The American prize was not long until her own removal from British service - as much for eliminating a sore point in the wake of improving relations as that the British system of maintaining stores of uniform structural 'spares' at most of her naval posts afar was not easily conducive to maintaining the unique & vastly differing elements of naval engineering such as one of the American Super Frigates of Live Oak.

constitution.gif

 
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The royal Navy knew the new ships the Americans called frigates were in reality the approximate equivalent of the then obsolecent 4th rate line-of-battle-ships, and there was no dishonour in surrendering to a far superior opponent. Fortunes of war. However, capturing or sinking one of these "monsters" would have been the ambition of many an RN frigate captain and crew. The prize or blood money would have been considerable, so many a captain tried his luck regardless.
The British also had an institutional arrogance. They were used to winning against odds when fighting French and Spanish ships. British captains would have expected easy victories against the upstart Yankees in their “fir-built frigates” which is what they called the Humphreys 44s.
 
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Really? The only one I've come across was the capture of HMS Junon by two Fench Frigates in 1806, care to supply details?



Well that's one view. When the orders were published on the West Indies station, they caused the frigate crews to threaten mutiny if they were forced to carry them out. Really sounds like Bitish Naval morale cracking at the seams. :rolleyes::D



American ships were bigger, faster, better armed and due to their small numbers crewed by the best, most experienced seamen available (including many British deserters). That's a historical fact, but it was accepted as "just one of those things" by the Royal Navy. I'm unaware of any Naval accusations of "cheating".

When the two sides met on equal terms, it took no more than 15minutes for HMS Shannon to capture the USS Chesapeake.
It’s hard to claim that a well worked up ship commanded by a gunnery fanatic was equal to a ship with a green crew that had been blockaded in harbor were equals. Yes they were physically almost identical, but Shannon had every other advantage including the weather gage.
 
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Ahh, USS Chesapeake... Sir Philip Broke was one of the finest Skippers in the British arsenal. An expert in calculating drill & tactics. Even a bit of baiting, as well. He would muster his crew to attention quite regularly & present them with a problem, fostering & encouraging each to calculate solutions, not just as individuals, but as various elements & as a crew overall.

The man knew the value of crack shot Marines in his tops, the potential inherent in allowing his crews to seek a decision by capitalizing on developing events as they unfolded without being so fully constrained by a doctrine so cast in stone as to disallow independent problem solving in the midst & heat of battle - to a much greater extent than his adversaries.

James Lawrence was a fool & fought his ship as one against HMS Shannon. The victory for Sir Philip Broke was not one of superior ships, it was one of a vastly superior British Captain & crew over a much less skilled skipper & crew with no real element of cohesive training upon which to draw in their midst. USS Chesapeake was never in a sufficient or respectable state of readiness under Lawrence, as much due to the best of the crew having left with Decateur for a ship that did not seemingly have a 'dark star' over its masts. USS Chesapeake - other than under Decatuer - did indeed seem to never be far from bad luck. (I say this believing in no such thing as a bad luck ship)

You'll find no disdain or even slightly ill opinion of Sir Philip Broke from me. I think so highly of the man that I would go so far as to surmise that if Broke - alone - had taken command of USS Chesapeake even 3 weeks before the match - leaving intact the crew he had trained aboard HMS Shannon - he was so adept at his craft that he might well have been able to have defeated HMS Shannon just by his person & expertise at training & drill - yes, he was THAT good!

He is indeed quite lucky that he, himself, survived from the saber blade to the head received during the engagement which effectively ended his career in command at sea. Somewhat permanently disfigured, he did not seek nor remain in retirement & very much joined in the official endeavour to advance the establishment of far greater training regimes in the Royal Navy. Though I have never been able to determine - with any certainty - to what extent he might actually have been able to fully maintain his previous effect in that role as he had so expertly & eloquently fostered & produced at sea in his crews, Sir Philip Broke was by no means ever anything less than exceptional.

Incidentally, one can still walk the decks & touch the live oak timbers of USS Chesapeake... She was later broken up at Gosport & her timber used to create or rebuild the still existing Chesapeake Mill in Wickham. (The Chesapeake Mill is now not functional, but is instead a gift shop) It is not difficult - when one knows it - to see the various elements & other tell tales signs in the structure if one visits. One can, if they call ahead & but properly ask, be allowed to 'look around' beyond the general areas of the shop now in business there.

As to the 'Constitution' class, they were more properly known by all that ever engaged or graced their decks more properly as Super Frigates - which they very much were - and bore no resemblance in structural framing to any warship then afloat - most certainly any sort of 'ship of the line', 4th rate or otherwise. In fact, their framing was very much based upon that of a particular type of barn then becoming somewhat useful in North America. That bit alone lent itself greatly to their inherent strength beyond just the American Live Oak used extensively in their construct.

No, more accurately, one could make a fair argument that they would well be best considered as some of the earliest Cruisers in their abilities, attributes, strength, means & speed. They could, in fact, & did most often scout/sortie alone, & they could generally always outrun anything that they could not outgun & run down most anything that they could match or outgun - how the ship was fought always being a matter which could render a decision in any battle.

It should also be noted... HMS Shannon was never again anything approaching the stout vessel she once was, even though she did remain on the roles & continued to serve the Royal Navy further in various capacities. She certainly did not survive the battle without her own serious damage & she was no more or less a wreck than the prize she won in USS Chesapeake. The American prize was not long until her own removal from British service - as much for eliminating a sore point in the wake of improving relations as that the British system of maintaining stores of uniform structural 'spares' at most of her naval posts afar was not easily conducive to maintaining the unique & vastly differing elements of naval engineering such as one of the American Super Frigates of Live Oak.

constitution.gif

Chesapeake wasn’t a super-frigate, but a return to the European-style frigates. She lacked the massive framing and heavy timbers of the forty fours.
 
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The remaining question is what think you of its impact upon the 'invincible' morale of the British Navy?
The invincible part of Royal Navy morale was not that they fought when they would win but that they would fight whenever a fight was in the offing. What we see after the early engagements is lots of frigate captains trying to sneak around orders to contrive one to one duels.
Chesapeake wasn’t a super-frigate, but a return to the European-style frigates. She lacked the massive framing and heavy timbers of the forty fours.

Yeah in most regards Chesapeake was fairly ordinary, as a prize she offered little the Royal Navy did not know. President on the other was far more significant as the US super frigates while possibly a natural progression from the heavy or 18 pounder frigates the Americans were the first to make the true leap though the British and the French had experimented with 24 pounder main battery frigates before this. That the President lost to the Endymion which was one of these experimental frigates shows that they were not singular wonder weapons. Much of their early success rested on the good sense and judgement of their captains and the professionalism of their crews.

The British of course responded by spamming fir-built (often pitch pine in practice) frigates which could be laid down at short notice and razeeing three 74 gun ships. Majestic one of the former 74s with a 32 pounder main battery was one of the pursuing ships at President's final fight. The thing was the Americans had led the way to the first class frigates of the middle of the century and demonstrated that they knew a thing or two about building wooden ships.
 
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The impact upon morale is best answered perhaps by the British reaction to these defeats, which was ultimately to issue orders that their own frigates were to avoid single combat with the American vessels. I dont know the exact dates that these orders were issued or received but they were executed and the British Navy sought thereafter safety in numbers of which they had a surplus.
After the defeat of the Chesapeake the USN also issued orders to its ships to avoid one-on-one engagements against British frigates.

It's also tiresome to hear the old myth that the Chesapeake had a raw crew. In reality she'd just returned from a voyage and almost all of the crew signed on again. Certainly her gunnery was better than any of the American super-frigates, as Peter Padfield pointed out in his book on the engagement.
 
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The invincible part of Royal Navy morale was not that they fought when they would win but that they would fight whenever a fight was in the offing. What we see after the early engagements is lots of frigate captains trying to sneak around orders to contrive one to one duels.


Yeah in most regards Chesapeake was fairly ordinary, as a prize she offered little the Royal Navy did not know. President on the other was far more significant as the US super frigates while possibly a natural progression from the heavy or 18 pounder frigates the Americans were the first to make the true leap though the British and the French had experimented with 24 pounder main battery frigates before this. That the President lost to the Endymion which was one of these experimental frigates shows that they were not singular wonder weapons. Much of their early success rested on the good sense and judgement of their captains and the professionalism of their crews.

The British of course responded by spamming fir-built (often pitch pine in practice) frigates which could be laid down at short notice and razeeing three 74 gun ships. Majestic one of the former 74s with a 32 pounder main battery was one of the pursuing ships at President's final fight. The thing was the Americans had led the way to the first class frigates of the middle of the century and demonstrated that they knew a thing or two about building wooden ships.
The British needed a lot of frigates, they could not build a lot of super frigates, quality is the method of the underdog in many cases. The US were building only a few ships they could sink more into each one. A a few super filtrates in British navy would be hardlly that unlikely to be exactly where the US frigates popped up, a few better frigates did not solve the problems of guarding many merchants across many seas. Building lots of average/inferior frigates made as much sense for the British (who needed a lt or presence all over the seas) as building a few better onbes made sense for the US. The "Successes" of the US frigates was overstated even unfair fights they one were often at th expense of their actual mission, as even after winning they had to return home as they damage was too much for continued raiding. The British captains knew their job, protect the merchants even if outmatched and losing they could still do enough to prevent further raiding by that US frigate. The US captains would of been wiser to avoid the glort duels and focus on their mission. And while the US frigates garnered much attention and glory the real damage was done by far more numerous US privateers which sunk far more ships, which ordinary frigates could counter, in fact even the smallest frigates was generally enough. The British frigates worked hard many were at sea for long years thus not at their best.

Frigate captains are generally chosen for their aggression and independence by nature glory hounds and risk takers. The Hussars of the waves,

The US ship builders were good, and their privateers were well built and fast and US ship yards would be the backbone of the later slave trade as the requirements were similar.
 
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The British also had an institutional arrogance. They were used to winning against odds when fighting French and Spanish ships. British captains would have expected easy victories against the upstart Yankees in their “fir-built frigates” which is what they called the Humphreys 44s.
A US myth. The British capians knew the odds when the opposing ship had much greater weight of broadside and range they were not expecting easy victories.
 
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Frigate captains are generally chosen for their aggression and independence by nature glory hounds and risk takers. The Hussars of the waves,
I think there is much to what you say but that is is perhaps the truest part of your post. The thing is wars are not won by weight of metal nor economics alone though both played their part. US privateers, as was the case with the French, were not terribly successful as a tool of war, they were in fact more a symptom of the tightness of the British blockade which rendered customary trade (except funnily enough, for most of the war, with the British Army in the Iberian Peninsula) impossible. The frigates on the other hand served as important morale boosts when the war on land was not going well. Indeed they became part of the mythos which allowed the Americans to skirt around the fact their utterly failed in their objectives for the war.

The British response was in fact what we would today call a hi lo mix, they did build super frigates, razee 74s and add more traditional 24 pounders on the Endymion pattern but in fir. They also boosted the normal production of 18 pounder frigates, which as you say provided numbers and were normally ample to the job, with additional fir built ships.
 
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I think there is much to what you say but that is is perhaps the truest part of your post. The thing is wars are not won by weight of metal nor economics alone though both played their part. US privateers, as was the case with the French, were not terribly successful as a tool of war, they were in fact more a symptom of the tightness of the British blockade which rendered customary trade (except funnily enough, for most of the war, with the British Army in the Iberian Peninsula) impossible. The frigates on the other hand served as important morale boosts when the war on land was not going well. Indeed they became part of the mythos which allowed the Americans to skirt around the fact their utterly failed in their objectives for the war.

The British response was in fact what we would today call a hi lo mix, they did build super frigates, razee 74s and add more traditional 24 pounders on the Endymion pattern but in fir. They also boosted the normal production of 18 pounder frigates, which as you say provided numbers and were normally ample to the job, with additional fir built ships.
the war of 1812 is another of the cases were the losers wrote the History, much like the French in the Napoleonic wars (outside the British writing their bits)

The Privateers were successful for a time really annoying an tied up much more resources and did more damage than the frigates. The British mostly got heir responses right. But it took time to get them under control.
 
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Arizona
After the defeat of the Chesapeake the USN also issued orders to its ships to avoid one-on-one engagements against British frigates.

It's also tiresome to hear the old myth that the Chesapeake had a raw crew. In reality she'd just returned from a voyage and almost all of the crew signed on again. Certainly her gunnery was better than any of the American super-frigates, as Peter Padfield pointed out in his book on the engagement.
As I understand it most of Chesapeake’s crew followed their captain to his new ship. Their replacements were not well trained.
 
Joined Nov 2020
793 Posts | 549+
Arizona
the war of 1812 is another of the cases were the losers wrote the History, much like the French in the Napoleonic wars (outside the British writing their bits)

The Privateers were successful for a time really annoying a tied up much more resources and did more damage than the frigates. The British mostly got heir responses right. But it took time to get them under control.
Privateers were never under control. The fiscal benefits were too high, a single voyage could pay for the cost of building and equipping a privateer leaving everything after that pure profit. Crews cost nothing, like pirates they operated on shares of the profits. French, Spanish and American privateers made fortunes for their owners while British privateers barely broke even due to lack of targets.
 
Joined Aug 2020
2,833 Posts | 2,454+
Devon, England
Privateers were never under control. The fiscal benefits were too high, a single voyage could pay for the cost of building and equipping a privateer leaving everything after that pure profit. Crews cost nothing, like pirates they operated on shares of the profits. French, Spanish and American privateers made fortunes for their owners while British privateers barely broke even due to lack of targets.
A single voyage needed to pay for the investment.

"Although more than 600 American privateers were licensed, only 27% of them made more than a single cruise, indicating both the large number of lost or unsuccessful vessels and the owners’ low tolerance of risk."

"There is no doubt that privateers served as an offensive weapon, sometimes extremely offensive, according to various newspapers. Unlike the navy, they operated independently, only occasionally cooperating with one another, but always with one eye on the horizon and the other on the bottom line. The objective was to repay the owners’ original investment on the first cruise and make their fortune on succeeding cruises. Given the large number of one-time cruises, it would seem that this goal was not easily attained. Even when a prize was taken, profits had to be shared between the owners and their officers and crew, with sales sometimes barely covering the court costs. Privateering investors usually spread the risk by acquiring shares in several vessels, but as the war went on and prizes began drying up, the interest in privateering declined accordingly. They understood that if one type of commercial activity ceased to be profitable, there were other ways of making money."


Faye M. Kert


In comparing British privateers against American it is worth noting that of Canadian/Halifax based privateers some 44% made more than 1 voyage, indicating break even but only 4 made more than 3 voyages including the super profitable Liverpool Packet (which interestingly enough was captured, employed unsuccessfully by the Americans and then recaptured before going on to take around 12 more prizes). What perhaps distorts perception is that while most privateers failed to make money some American privateers were very profitable making at least 4 separate letter of marque voyages. It was an enterprise requiring high skills and the skill level required only rose higher as the British blockade intensified.
 

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