Clearly they weren't and I'm not sure whether France had the best tank but I am sure they didn't have the best generals.
Well German tanks mostly had 3 man turrets giving an advantage but you're right, the revolution was the way they were handled.
The blitzkrieg doctrine was a modern update of the stormtrooper tactics that came close to winning victory in March 1918.
Overall the best German tank of 1940 was the Panzer III A-F. It had armor of 70 mm at its thickest (not particularly well sloped), a 3.7 cm KwK 36 Gun, had a max road speed of 25 mph (40 Km/h). Germany made 611 of them by the time of the Battle of France (I do not have sources for how many Panzer IIIs were actually deployed though).
The best French "cavalry tank" (intended to fight armor) was the SOMUA S 35. It's armor was only 47 mm at its thickest (but included sloped a little), a 47 mm SA 35 main gun, and had a top road speed of 25.3 mph (40.7 Km/h). Only 430 were produced by 1940, and the tank was due for replacement by S 40 in that year.
The SOMUA was lighter and less heavily armored, but it was faster, its armor was sloped and its gun could easily handle the German tanks of 1940. Over all, these two would be about equal, though actions of the Battle of France saw French SOMUAs at Hannut "defeat" German Panzers as they moved through Belgium with relatively minimal losses. The problem for France in the engagement is that Hannut was NORTH of where the main German thrust was, and while the Germans suffered a tactical defeat there, it accomplished the overall German strategy.
The best French infantry tank (intended to fight enemy infantry) was the Char B1. Depending on specific variants, the B1s armor was between 40 and 60 mm at its thickest. It's primary armament was a 47 mm SA 34 gun, and its secondary armament included more then just machine guns. It's secondary armament included on hull mounted 75 mm ABS SA 35 howitzer. It's max road speed however, was only 17 mph (28 Km/h). Only 405 of various models were produced.
The Char B1 was heavier, slower, and required a well trained crew to use, which France had in short supply in 1940. However, the Germans found to their horror that the Char B1 was almost invulnerable to any anti-tank weapon the Germans had at the time. The only weapon they could use was the 88 Flak battery (which would be used for the first time against tanks against British Matildas, which are even more heavily armored then the Char B1, at Arras). German tank crews and infantrymen feared running into the Char B1 during the battle. Thankfully for the Germans, French air cover was so poor that most of these tanks proved to be easy targets for ground attack aircraft.
And in addition, the vast bulk of France's tanks were infantry support tanks that were of much lighter armor and armament then the SOMUA or the Char B1. This combined with poor handling of them tactically was France's doom.
Gamelin and Weygand were both inferior, but they still recognized the vulnerability of the flank the Germans had in Operation Fell Geb. The problem for France was that they spent the 20s and 30s listening to Petain, who "on paper" was believed to be a better general and ignored De Gaulle who would only become a 1 star General as the Battle of France began to wind down.
The stormtrooper tactics of WWI were all infantry. Blitzkrieg was developed in a combination of forces with the tank and air power taking presidence... although some of the striking at weak points and cutting off headquarters from the front and isolating units was probably integrated into Blitzkrieg tactics...
Though, Guderian was not the only man to have the idea. The British general who commanded British tanks at Cambrai in WWI advocated the tactical use of armor in the UK and Charles De Gaulle advocated using armor in a professional and organized manner in France during the 30s (and there have been some sources that would indicate that Guderian borrowed ideas from BOTH of them). The key difference was that Hilter listened and gave Guderian the funds. The British didn't really have the money and the French refused to listen.