Bagdad is NOT close to the red sea (another 10000 to 1500 km over tough terrain, nor are there good ports on the northern coast of the red sea,.
There is no shipyard , no workers, it's a poor idea.
What if Germany completed a railroad to Baghdad before WWI?
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There is no shipyard , no workers, it's a poor idea.
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A poor one at massive cost and totally indefeasible, Just where exactly? It;s not really a greatly inhabited coast were is the workforce coming from> where are bnasic raw materials??
I'm not sure if it would have improved the way certain cultures viewed certain other cultures. There were a lot of ideological factors that came in to play and came to a head to create that powder keg.
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With the Old Ball and Chain
I don't really see what the former has to do with the subject and the latter doesn't seem supported. After the completion of the line in 1940, British (And Germany, IIRC) assessments of the Turkish railway network was that it was sufficient to support around 20 or so German divisions. That's not an insignificant capacity in peace time or wartime, which is what others have been talking about.
Source for this 20 division claim. Seems pretty fantastical on the face of it,
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With the Old Ball and Chain
Sure, but can you post your source for saying the railways were low capacity first? Would be useful to compare.
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Also, apparently there was a Romanian alternative route to the Serbian route. A neutral or Central Powers aligned Romania would be a major game changer:
"There were other reasons, for instance, the infrastructure of the Turkish railways was not in a good condition.382 Although Turkish Government was working for the expansion of the connections since 1923, in most of the routes, there was only one railway lane which was used both directions. Sometimes the trains carrying chrome waited for days until another train passes and the lane becomes free. Not only the lanes but also the number of wagons and locomotives were inadequate. "
page 142
The World War Two Allied Economic Warfare: The Case of Turkish Chrome Sales
Inaugural-Dissertation in der Philosophischen Fakultät und Fachbereich Theologie der Friedrich-Alexander-Universität
Erlangen Nürnberg Vorgelegt von Murat Önsoy
Aus der Türkei D29
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I'm not surprised the railways in the 1920s were low capacity, given the Berlin to Baghdad Project had been abandoned as a result of the war and then you have to figure in the damage from both World War I and the following Turkish Civil War. The railways began to recover in the 1930s with the stabilized political situation and the help of foreign technical expertise, culminating in the completion of the Berlin to Baghdad Railway in 1940 which was how Turkey supplied the Germans with their chromium.
Specific to force sizes, British estimates were the Germans could run a four Panzer Division and six Infantry Division (10 in total) force on the railways while they could put a force of 10 or so along the Taurus Mountains; so the 20 figure was combined usage of both sides:
My source is not talking about the 1920s but the 1940s
It does not say that. It estimates German forces that could possibly be deployed. It does not mention the Tarsus at all.Specific to force sizes, British estimates were the Germans could run a four Panzer Division and six Infantry Division (10 in total) force on the railways while they could put a force of 10 or so along the Taurus Mountains; so the 20 figure was combined usage of both sides:
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The only date it gives is 1923:
"There were other reasons, for instance, the infrastructure of the Turkish railways was not in a good condition.382 Although Turkish Government was working for the expansion of the connections since 1923, in most of the routes, there was only one railway lane which was used both directions. Sometimes the trains carrying chrome waited for days until another train passes and the lane becomes free. Not only the lanes but also the number of wagons and locomotives were inadequate. "
It does say that in the second paragraph and then the map itself even directly depicts the proposed line in the Tarusus:
Specific to the point of capacity, you'll recall my statement was the British assessed that the Turkish railways could support 20 Divisions. Per the source, this would be 10 German Divisions along with 10 of their own and almost 70 air squadrons, which suggests a pretty substantial logistical capacity as you noted previously.
You said the railway (Bagdad) could support 20 you have since backtracked to 10,The only date it gives is 1923:
"There were other reasons, for instance, the infrastructure of the Turkish railways was not in a good condition.382 Although Turkish Government was working for the expansion of the connections since 1923, in most of the routes, there was only one railway lane which was used both directions. Sometimes the trains carrying chrome waited for days until another train passes and the lane becomes free. Not only the lanes but also the number of wagons and locomotives were inadequate. "
It does say that in the second paragraph and then the map itself even directly depicts the proposed line in the Tarusus:
Specific to the point of capacity, you'll recall my statement was the British assessed that the Turkish railways could support 20 Divisions. Per the source, this would be 10 German Divisions along with 10 of their own and almost 70 air squadrons, which suggests a pretty substantial logistical capacity as you noted previously.
As pointed out, it´s far away from Baghdad.
Osmans DID build Hejaz railway, Damascus to Medina. It had some participation of Germans, but mostly by Osman subjects. The mainline went inland. There was some talk about a branchline to Aqaba port, but it did not materialize. In any case, navigationally Persian Gulf is easier to reach than Aqaba.
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Do 10 German Divisions and 10 Commonwealth Divisions not add up to 20? As explained in my last post, the British assessment was that the Turkish railway system could collectively support that many.
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Yep another train journey from Baghdad on new train to be constructed to the Persian Gulf.
your source dies biot say anything like that, th only reference !0 commonwealth divisions is teh strength of Middle East command. (not being even vaguely supplied by te reailway)
your source make NO claims at all about the railway supply capabilities,
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Except it does say that, actually:
The map demonstrates the significance of the defensive positions chosen by the British. The 'Confidence' line broadly followed the Turkish railway network where it exited the Taurus Mountains, while the 'Sprawl' land forces would hold the key points further west. To transport large forces through the Taurus at anything other than a snail's pace, the Germans would need to use the railways, the crucial portions of which would be held by the British. No British ground forces would operate north of the Taurus. It was Turkish suspicion of this limited commitment, to the strategically important areas in southern Turkey, which Hugessen had reported in December 1941.97|
By March - and in the wake of a renewed Axis offensive in North Africa which had retaken Cyrenaica - even these plans had been drastically scaled back. The 'Sprawl' air forces would still assist the Turks, but the supporting brigade groups would only provide cover for the RAF, and would not engage the Germans, whose anticipated invasion force was four armoured and six motorised divisions. The forces available to the Ninth Army fell short of those required for 'Confidence,' but could be deployed to support the 'Sprawl' force by occupying a less-ambitious line, demarcated "Defraud.' This ran significantly to the south of 'Confidence,' but still incorporated strategic points on the railway network, at Osmaniye and Gaziantep. Rather than holding these successfully against the Germans, the British now anticipated their destruction during an inevitable Allied retreat, significantly delaying the Axis forces' passage towards Syria and Iraq.
Besides the above, the map (taken from British planning documents) states the Germans would advance along the railways and directly depicts which railways they would use in their advance. Along with that, it also depicts the proposed British line(s) in the Taurus Mountains and what railways could be used to support them logistically.
No it does Not, NOthig nayway says how this forces wld be supported logistically, You are drawing inferences. There is nothing clearly stated.
The Briiish talked about finishing the line to inxreese there support butt as they only intended to deploy about 4 divisions they could support them without doing so, Which kinda suggest there was some other logistical support supporting that force,
For starters if there is railways like running through points A B C D. If the Gerrmans support 10 divsios sorghum A - B and the British support 10 diversions C - D is a logical fallacy to to say the support capacity of A-D is 20 divisions,
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The text literally says the Germans were going to transport their forces along the railways:
The map demonstrates the significance of the defensive positions chosen by the British. The 'Confidence' line broadly followed the Turkish railway network where it exited the Taurus Mountains, while the 'Sprawl' land forces would hold the key points further west. To transport large forces through the Taurus at anything other than a snail's pace, the Germans would need to use the railways, the crucial portions of which would be held by the British. No British ground forces would operate north of the Taurus. It was Turkish suspicion of this limited commitment, to the strategically important areas in southern Turkey, which Hugessen had reported in December 1941.97|
The map key also directly says the German advance would use the railway network.
Again, that's not what the text says:
This force, code-named 'Sprawl, comprised 26 RAF squadrons, supported by four brigade groups and anti-aircraft artillery from the British Ninth Army. These supporting forces would advance into southern Anatolia, operating on a line between Mersin and Adana. Simultaneously with the despatch of this force, the Ninth Army would commence work on additional defensive positions in the Taurus region, between Diyarbakir and Maras. This part of the plan, code-named 'Confidence,' required three armoured and three infantry divisions, and 43 further air force squadrons operating across the Northern Front.
The British planned for vastly more than "about four divisions" as outlined by the text:- Three armored divisions
- Three infantry divisions
- Four brigade groups
- 69 RAF squadrons
- Anti-Aircraft troops and other supporting elements
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