I think at this point I should explain the frontage a bit better. Yes it is a front, in mountains fronts of engagement are usually not as wide as Kursk salient.
Rezang La is a secondary approach to Chusul valley in Ladakh towards the south-east. The length of the feature is about 5 kilometers and the span of deployment of C Company was 2 kilometers. Now if you consider that as 2000/120 = 16 m per man then I'll have to correct it here. In this terrain, even if a feature is 2 km long the whole span can neither be utilized for an assault nor for even spacing of defenders. You have to use these narrow, comparatively traversable routes known as gullies which are extremely hazardous if defended by dug in MG positions and vantage points. Vertically the level difference between Spanggur Tso lake and the red dot marking Rezang La is about 2000 ft. with intermittent gradual slopes and sharp inclines (so I understand).
Here's a 3D map of the entire Chusul Sector -
And here is a map showing the deployments and movements as of 18th November -
In this map, above the + marking Rezang La, there are three ellipses marking deployment of three platoons. The uppermost is the advance platoon (7th) on the downward slope. By that what I understand is a sub-ridge vantage point, not necessarily soldiers lying on the slope itself, otherwise they would have looked for another point. The middle one is 9th Platoon with Co. Hq with one 3 mm mortar section serving as direct fire support, the last one is 8th Platoon. Each platoon having 30 so men manning 3 vantage points covering as many gullies as possible, adequately armed with MMG and LMG positions well stacked with ammo.
The first Chinese attack materialized in this manner -
On night 17-18 November around 2200 hrs, a heavy snow storm blew over the battle zone for nearly two hours. After the snowstorm, visibility improved to 600 meters. At 0200 hrs, the listening post ahead of 8 Platoon observed a large body of Chinese soldiers swarming through the gullies at a distance of about 700-800 meters moving from the pass. Lance Naik Brij Lal the LP commander ran back to Platoon Headquarters to inform this unusual development. He, with his Section Commander Hukam Chand and one LMG were rushed as reinforcement to the post. By then the Chinese had advanced within firing range of small arms from the post. The LP fired a pre-determined red Verey Light signal along with long bursts of LMG fire, warning the C Company to ‘stand to’ in their dug out positions. Similarly, 7 Platoon’s LP on the forward slopes also saw Chinese forming up and the entire C Company was alerted. Maj Shaitan Singh immediately contacted his sub-unit commanders on the radio communication who confirmed that all ranks were ready in their battle positions. Since the paucity of troops had caused wide gaps in 7 and 9 Platoon localities, he also ordered 9 Platoon to send a patrol to ascertain the situation. The patrol confirmed massive Chinese build up had taken place through the gullies. Though, the Chinese had brought their assaulting troops to their forward assembly areas under the cover of inclement weather, their intensions to shock the defenders with silent surprise attack had failed.
All ranks of the Charlie Company with their fingers on triggers, waited patiently for the impending major frontal attack on their positions around first light with improving visibility. Around 0500 hrs, the first wave of the Chinese were spotted through their personal weapon sights by every Ahir manning the defences and hail of LMGs, MMGs and mortars fire greeted the enemy. Scores of the enemy died, many were wounded but rest duly reinforced continued to advance. Soon all the gullies leading to Rezang La were full of Chinese corpses. The Chinese launched four more attacks that were beaten back that dwindled defenders strength and ammunition as many Ahirs fell fighting. As the fifth attack was launched, Naik Chandgi Ram, a wrestler of repute led his comrades with bayonet charge. There were some skirmishes with the Chinese patrols that too were beaten back but one such patrol had severed the telephone line leading to the Battalion Headquarters. By about 0545 hrs, the Chinese frontal attack was beaten back and failed.
PLA artillery didn't even come into action during the first phase of the attack as the sole intention was overwhelm the Indian defenses by sheer manpower. Which could have been successful had the element of surprise not been lost and defenders caught off guard. Also FWIU the Chinese side did not have precise intel on the exact locations of the defenders. The conventional wisdom of bombarding the general area to soften up defenses is pointless in Himalayas. You can fire off a thousand rounds blindly while your target can remain safe behind boulders and jagged rocks a short distance away. The artillery PLA had were rather simple, 75 mm RCL guns mounted on barrows and 132 mm Katyusha rockets from makeshift platforms. However it is rather difficult to use position, prime and effectively use heavy weapons on a terrain like that in a blizzard. Also I have the impression that the PLA commander was not intent on wasting precious rockets until he had a good fix on Indian positions and was definitely not willing to use them while vanguard troops made the assaults considering collateral damage.
It was this first assault frontal assault that inflicted maximum casualties on the Chinese side. Again, I don't know exactly how many the Chinese were, but out of a force of 6000 it is not beyond possibility that at least a thousand or so were involved in 5 rounds of frontal assaults on three positions along the gullies. It wouldn't even make sense to assault these difficult positions with less numbers when artillery support is not available. Also Chinese troops at this point do not have, as I understand anything other than standard Norinoco made SKS rifles, not a very significant advantage over Indian .303 SMLEs considering the Indians are firing downward with a weapon having 20% more effective range. Also there are the MGs and the mortar section.
It was after the first phase of attack ended the shelling began. With both RCLs and rockets. After this shelling came the second Chinese two pronged assault, mostly from flanking positions. In the map above you can see red arrows marking Chinese attack coming on C Company from both directions. But in reality it didn't happen in the first phase but the attack from the rear came in the second phase. Also the map doesn't have timestamps. However this also didn't achieve any element of surprise, since flank and front are somewhat pointless when the Indians can see their your every move in the light of dawn. However this attack could not be repelled as PLA fire support was much denser with LMG troops often covering assault parties. Plus the Indians had already suffered thinning of their ranks in the first attack and subsequent artillery fire. Nevertheless, PLA had to fight an uphill battle again to secure the locations.
So I don't really see as to why the 500-1000 Chinese dead can be seen as impossible given the circumstances.
Yes it is him. He graduated from the National Defence Academy of Pune and Indian Military Academy of Dehradun. He is a war vet and a chief minister, so I can rather safely deduce that he has access to information any random other fellow won't have. And if you start looking for degrees as a credibility check for military historians, you'll be disappointed in a lot of cases. Both Richard B Frank and James D Hornfischer are lawyers by education.
Nah, you got it completely wrong with the 2 km, which was evident in your 16m per man assessment. This is not Afrika Corps trying to ambush an allied convoy moving through a desert pass.
About your "Japanese defenses in Pacific" and "superior tech and all", you mean to say you are comparing the artillery PLA had at Rezang La to the US Fifth Fleet at Tarawa? I can go on on that till I drop dead but it's pointless and stupid to compare USS Colorado and USS Maryland with a few wheelbarrow mounted RCLs. Not to mention Corsairs from 17 aircraft carriers raining down rockets and bullets. That would most definitely be a joke.
But since you mentioned the Pacific, I'll give you an example as to how a well dug in enemy, albeit operating on an entirely different terrain can do to a much, much larger opposing force even under unbelievable disparity in firepower. Take the morning of Saipan landings. What did the Japanese have, only shore defenses, barbed wires, mines, a few artillery pieces and MG emplacements. Up against them were 8000 marines from 2nd and 4th Divisions under fire support from Tennessee, California, Indianapolis, Birmingham and eight destroyers. The first LVTs came ashore at around 0900 hours; it took them till nightfall to establish the first beachhead.
So next time you mention the Pacific, be a little more specific as to which engagement you are talking about. Tenaru assault? Hacksaw ridge? Edson's ridge? Mount Suribachi?
Where are we exactly?
Yes. I accept that I misread that part. I take my statement regarding 700 (or 722 in particular) being between 500-1000 back. Doesn't change anything else, as I have already explained how the battle took place to my knowledge.
There were none. Hence the investigation, eyewitnesses testimonies, battlefield reconstruction etc. The numbers might be a huge range I don't really see the point of taking your numbers* at face value. Nobody does in war. And I don't really care whether you trust our numbers because to be frank, nobody ever does. Hence I don't really press for 1300. 500-1000 looks quite logical to me. But I do not know the details as I haven't read the book.
*Also I don't know whether this number is the official Chinese declaration or someone else's. The number mentioned in Wikipedia comes from this book -
Chinese Warfighting
It is quite obvious that you don't even read a post properly and yet are quite ready to pick other's misinterpretations. It's not 'my own book'. I have clearly written twice in two posts that I haven't read it. Neither do I own it. The only book I have read on the war doesn't even deal with this battle, it's on an far more disastrous engagement at Namka-Chu in NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh these days). The only reason I mentioned this book is that in my second link, the article mentioned that Capt Singh put Chinese casualites as 500-1000. That IMHO is a more plausible result of an inquiry conducted under such paucity of direct evidence than a blunt 1300.
And I have clearly written in my last post (which you didn't even bother to read as is evident from your strawman), if you're interested feel free to check it out.
